Most of my readers might not have heard of Dr Eduard Zellweger, and if they do, they must have forgotten about him.
Yet, in 1960s, he was the man who influenced local politicians to start thinking of regional governments as the answer to the fear of “ethnic domination”.
Why the British allowed this Swiss lawyer — who had lofty ideas on how the Swiss federal system had worked — to shape the thinking at Lancaster, is not known.
Although they had disdain for him, as reflected in some secret memos written by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Reginald Maulding, the British did little to stop the experiment favoured by the colonial settlers as the best safeguard to their interests.
Again, whether Zellweger’s ideas later metamorphosed into modern-day county governments, is a matter that should be left to political scientists and historians – but what we know is that he took advantage of a disorganised Kenya African Democratic Union (Kadu) to push his ideas.
REFERENDUM
As Kenyans marked Mashujaa Day yesterday, it is perhaps time to start conversations on the origin of political experiments in Kenya’s history.
At the moment, a debate is starting on a possible referendum which will be an examination on the institutions set-up by the 2010 Constitution.
By the time he died in June 1975, Zellweger’s influence on local politics had waned, nay forgotten.
His experiment had been put aside by Jomo Kenyatta as “unworkable” — with centralisation, which had been pushed for by Kanu during the Lancaster talks, gaining favour.
The British did not like Kenyatta and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and Reginald Maulding described Kanu as a congregation of “old-guard of thugs and ex-detainees who work with Mr Odinga, the main beneficiary of Communist money”.
FEDERALISM
Maulding also said that although Kenyatta’s “mental powers are clearly declining and his colleagues openly acknowledge this, his hold over tribe and its terrorist organisation remains strong enough for him to be a most formidable figure, particularly in alliance with Mr Oginga Odinga”.
That it was Zellweger who had poisoned our politicians’ minds with a federalism experiment in early 1960s is still not appreciated – and hardly forms part of the national discourse.
A friend of mine recently sent me a Top Secret document authored by Secretary of State for the Colonies Reginald Maulding in March 1962 in which he discusses the influence of Zellweger on our first Constitution.
In the note tabled before at the Cabinet, he reported that Kadu “had based their ideas on what they call ‘federalism’ or ‘regionalism’.
In detail their proposals have been much influenced by the fact that they are advised by a Swiss constitutional expert; and many features of their proposals, while no doubt workable in Switzerland, make no sense in Kenya.
“They have been determined to erect what they call ‘defence in depth’ by dividing Kenya into six regional states with legislative and administrative powers on a large scale, and further by insisting on a second chamber with powers equal to that of the federal lower house.”
BULLY
In his secret memo, the colonial secretary knew that the Majimbo experiment would not work: “While their proposals might protect local interests, this is not in my mind certain. On the other hand, it is quite clear that, from the point of view of practical administration, they make little sense.”
So, if the Harold Macmillan government knew that the Majimbo system would not work, then why did they allow the discussions to progress along such lines.
From his observation, Maulding thought that the Kadu group in the talks led by Ronald Ngala, Daniel arap Moi, Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro was “intransigent” during the talks and was trying to bully Kanu to accept Majimbo – whole being reluctant to drop from its position.
“Kadu’s tactics throughout have been as intransigent as possible, and such concessions as they have made have been very small and wrung from them only by a process like extracting teeth,” wrote Colonial Secretary.
SUPPORT
Interestingly, even the white settler-led Kenya Coalition Party of colonial maverick Cavendish Bentinck, which threw its weight behind Kadu, did not seem to like the idea of Majimbo.
This is mainly because before the arrival of Dr Zellweger into the scene, it had not been fully discussed.
But Kadu was looking for a chance to delay independence to organise its house.
“Kenya Coalition Party have concentrated mainly on the protection of European lives and property. On the whole they share Kadu’s views on the Kikuyu (the fear of dominance) but recognise the unpracticality of Kadu’s proposals and have been trying to improve them.”
It had emerged during the talks that Jomo Kenyatta grudgingly supported Majimbo just to ensure progress in the talks.
The fear in Westminster was that Kenyatta would later overthrow the Majimbo system “by constitutional means”.
KIKUYUS
Maulding suggested that to stop Kenyatta’s “coup d’etat”, they should decentralise the command of the security forces.
“No guarantee can be given against a coup d’etat but the danger can be minimised by decentralising command of the security forces and by preventing the Kikuyu, and their allies, from establishing a predominant position in the armed forces.”
The other plot on the table was that Tom Mboya and his moderates would walk away from Kenyatta but to the surprise of Maulding, the “intransigent tactics of Kadu have tended to unite Kanu. Secondly, Mr Mboya and the moderates do not feel strong enough at this stage to break with Mr Kenyatta and his Kikuyu and terrorist following, nor can they yet persuade Mr Kenyatta to break from Mr Oginga Odinga and his money.”
On September 26, 1963, the third and final Lancaster House constitutional Conference on Kenya opened in London amidst fear that Kadu was threatening to plunge the country into war.
The Colonial Secretary asked the Cabinet to approve Kanu’s proposals to centralise police power.
“Any riots should be containable,” the Cabinet was told on October 8, 1963. “Therefore, go forward and try some modification in favour of Kanu even at some risk of trouble with Kadu.”
INVITATION
At the final end, Zellweger was not a friend of the British authorities and was hated by Kanu.
All we know is that a month to Independence, Kadu’s Ronald Ngala had been asked by Mboya, then Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, to submit a list of opposition guests.
Among the names he submitted was that of Zellweger and that of Freddy Bennett, a member of Parliament for the Conservative Party.
But Ngala was to later learn that Mboya had declined the invitation leading to a confrontation inside Parliament.
“This government is old, tired and lazy. When I asked the Minister to state the reasons, he only replied, ‘We do not have to explain the reasons for our action.”’
“I would like to know whether the government has done this because Freddy Bennett has been helpful to the Opposition. They (and Zellweger) have helped us to get this thing which is acceptable. Another Kanu leader, Daniel arap Moi, lamented that the government was restricting “men who have tried to be friendly and tried to take an interest in the people of Kenya, to see that they lived peacefully.”
CORRUPTION
While Mboya did not explain why Zellweger’s invitation had been declined, he said that his British counterpart was a prohibited person.
It was Ngala who had brought in the services of Zellweger after he realised that his party did not have a strong stand on the structure of government.
Some historian think that, as a result, Zellweger was the opinion shaper, and that Ngala was only a surrogate mother of Kenya’s Majimbo system.
The British accepted the Majimbo idea, not because it could work for Kenya, but to protect the settlers’ interests, in the short term.
And it is this idea which is now the bedrock of the devolved system of government — which are new citadels of corruption.
Jkamau@ke.nationmedia.com @johnkamau1