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Uhuru’s man: Numbers reveal Ruto didn’t win August polls but Raila lost

 

As the dust settles on the hotly contested August 9, 2022 General Election and the key players come to terms with their loss and victory, it is important to look at the poll numbers to deduce what really happened on that fateful day.

It is not in doubt that Azimio’s plan to win the election was simple — retain Raila Odinga’s 2013 and 2017 votes, then get a marginal increase in Mt Kenya votes, guaranteeing him a comfortable victory.

It had been projected that if Mr Odinga retained the 45 per cent national vote that he got in 2017 and added a marginal 20 per cent from Mt Kenya (comprising 26 per cent of the registered voters), it would translate to a further 5 per cent, giving him more than 50 per cent of the total votes cast and a first-round victory.

Kenya Kwanza, on the other hand, was seeking to retain all the votes that Jubilee got in the 2017 General Election and pick up more votes in Mr Odinga’s bedrock of Western and Coast regions, ensuring a 50 per cent + 1 vote and a first-round victory.

The results now show that both President William Ruto and Mr Odinga lost big in their strongholds. Mr Odinga gained a whopping 848,000 votes from Mt Kenya, which is more than his Kamba votes of 769,424, and 698,613 Western votes (excluding Bungoma which in recent elections has projected a different voting pattern) or the 649,913 Coast votes. Mt Kenya gave Mr Odinga the second highest number of votes after Luo Nyanza.

Dr Ruto made gains in Ukambani (20 per cent, up from 15 per cent) Coast (34 per cent, up from 26 per cent), Western, excluding Bungoma (27 per cent up from 11 per cent), and a major upset in Bungoma (63 per cent up from 36 per cent).

The choice of allies by both candidates led to them scoring big in their rival’s strongholds. However, the biggest question before the election was exactly how Mt Kenya, the biggest voting bloc in the country, would vote, in the absence of a dominant candidate from the region.

Azimio was optimistic that the Mt Kenya region would not stray far from their leader — retiring President Uhuru Kenyatta, for whom they had faithfully voted three times (in 2013 and twice in 2017).

There was also an expectation that the choice of Ms Martha Karua as Mr Odinga’s running mate and her sterling record as a reformer would galvanise the region’s votes for Mr Odinga.

Kenya Kwanza, on the other hand, was optimistic that Mt Kenya voters would feel they owed a debt to Dr Ruto because there was a promise of 10 years of rule for Mr Kenyatta and 10 years to his deputy, Dr Ruto.

Kenya Kwanza banked on the fact that Mr Odinga had been greatly vilified in the last three elections, and it would be difficult to change the view of the mwananchi in Mt Kenya to support him.

There was also a big debate around the turnout of voters, with Mr Odinga’s Azimio coalition publicly expressing optimism that the Mt Kenya voter turnout would be suppressed in the absence of their own presidential candidate.

The results in Mt Kenya were a mixed bag, with Mr Odinga getting 22 per cent of the vote, increasing his national votes by at least 4 per cent and giving him a chance to win the election.

Surprisingly, the 66 per cent voter turnout in Mt Kenya was above the national average of 64 per cent, working in Dr Ruto’s favour as he secured the lion’s share. All in all, President Kenyatta actually did deliver the 20 per cent and more of the Mt Kenya projection for Azimio, ensuring that Mr Odinga was on course to winning 50 per cent +1 of the vote if he could hold on to his traditional votes.

The choice of allies in western Kenya saw Dr Ruto get a mixture of votes in the region. His alliance with Amani National Congress’ Musalia Mudavadi helped dent Mr Odinga’s stranglehold over the Luhya, and the choice of Ford-Kenya’s Moses Wetang’ula saw Dr Ruto gain handsomely in Bukusu land.

Indeed, the duo of Wetang’ula and former Senate Speaker Kenneth Lusaka carried Dr Ruto to a landslide victory of 63 per cent over Mr Odinga in Bungoma. This was the single greatest loss for Mr Odinga in his strongholds.

Mr Odinga’s loss in Bukusu land can be traced back to a few years ago when his Orange Democratic Movement removed Mr Wetang’ula as the leader of minority in the Senate. From then on, Dr Ruto has been making forays into Bungoma, seeking to capitalise on the fact that the Bukusu felt aggrieved with their treatment by ODM. Mr Lusaka’s entry into Ford-Kenya cemented this new-found support of Dr Ruto in Bungoma, especially, and hastened the divorce from Mr Odinga.

Dr Ruto, despite his gains in Western, made his job of securing victory harder by losing votes where he ideally should have retained them, namely, in the Maa speaking areas, Upper Eastern and in North Eastern regions of the country. This is the bulk of pastoralists. These areas had voted with Jubilee and were expected to vote for Dr Ruto in the 2022 elections.

They failed to do so. There could be several explanations for this, including wrong candidates, conflict of issues (as between the Kipsigis and the Maasai in relation to the Mau Forest) and clan issues especially in North Eastern and Upper eastern, but could there be another?

My sense is that the pastoralists seem to have a desire to support the winning team because they do not want to be out of government, so whoever they perceive as winning is the one they will likely support.

In 2013, Mr Odinga was the Prime Minister and the perception was that he was the government candidate, and it was his election to win. The pastoralists supported him fully. In 2017, when President Kenyatta was the incumbent, he swept all counties of the pastoralists, save for Turkana.

In 2022, clearly the pastoralists, saw that Mr Odinga was the most likely victor, with massive state support and the support of the sitting President. They voted for him to a man. What is clear is that as soon as Dr Ruto was declared the winner, many of them did not waste time in decamping from Azimio and joining him.

Dr Ruto, nonetheless, made some significant gains in the Coast, moving from 26 per cent to 34 per cent — an 8 per cent increase.

That is not the whole story, he had huge campaigns in Kwale and Kilifi where he expected to score big, but he made only marginal gains in Kwale of 5 per cent and a greater increase in Kilifi of 12 per cent, but Mr Odinga still managed to secure victory in both, getting 70 per cent in Kwale and 72 per cent in Kilifi. It seems that though slightly weakened, Mr Odinga’s stranglehold on those Coast counties still remains.

Surprisingly, the biggest gain was made in Mombasa County, where Dr Ruto increased the tally from 29 per cent to 41 per cent.

The ethnic mix of Mombasa seems to greatly favour Mr Odinga and his Azimio coalition, but Dr Ruto still managed to put a dent in his following there. This seems to have been influenced by the support of Mr Mike Sonko, the former governor of Nairobi, who has a strong influence over urban youth. He also is a Kamba and most likely influenced the large Kamba population of Mombasa to vote for Dr Ruto.

Another noteworthy statistic is the low voter turnout in the three counties of the Kamba. The indecision of the leader of the Kamba community, Mr Kalonzo Musyoka, and his pronouncement earlier that he would not support Mr Odinga — on which he made an about-turn — probably led to the low turnout. Nonetheless, the Kamba, despite the indecision of Mr Musyoka, still voted in support of their leader, giving Mr Odinga almost 80 per cent of the vote.

Rift Valley region, as expected, turned out in large numbers to support its candidate. The 80 per cent turnout was the highest in the country by far, the next would be 72 per cent in Luo Nyanza. This high turnout and the great support for Dr Ruto cemented his victory. Nyanza gave Dr Ruto 23 per cent of its vote.

In the last election, President Kenyatta, with the help of Dr Ruto, had managed to score well in Kisii and Nyamira. He got 43 per cent of the votes in Kisii County and, incredibly, defeated Mr Odinga in Nyamira, getting 52 per cent of the vote. Come 2022, Mr Odinga reasserted his dominance over the two counties, effectively locking Dr Ruto out, leaving him with 35 per cent of the vote.

In Nairobi, Mr Odinga extended his victory from 51 per cent to 57 per cent, leaving Dr Ruto with 42 per cent, which mostly comprised Mt Kenya voters in Nairobi. It seems that all the Luos, Luhyas and Kambas to a man — and many of the Kisii and Somalis — voted for Mr Odinga, leaving Dr Ruto votes from the Kikuyu and other Mt Kenya communities, with a few stray votes from communities supporting Mr Odinga.

I believe the most important statistic of the 2022 election was the fact that only 72 per cent of the Luo came out to vote. In 2017, the Luo came out in large numbers to support their candidate, with an 80 per cent voter turnout — way above the national average. This time they were above the national average but failed to reach the 80 per cent mark that Rift Valley achieved in support of Dr Ruto. This is what inevitably lead to Mr Odinga losing the 2022 election. If the Luos had turned out to vote as they did in 2017, at 80 per cent, Mr Odinga would have got an additional 160,000 votes, effectively preventing a Ruto victory in the first round, in which case Mr Odinga would have 49.4 per cent of the vote and Ruto 49.9 per cent.

More importantly, voter apathy seems to have had a great effect on the voter turnout in Luo Nyanza. Having voted in large numbers four times for Mr Odinga, they had become somewhat uncertain of his chances of winning and, therefore, did not have the excitement to come out in large numbers. This, together with the growing number of candidates winning on independent tickets or on other parties, seems to indicate the waning influence that Mr Odinga has over the Luo.

A stark statistic from the 2022 election is the low voter turnout and what it portends. If you look at the total voting population of 22 million, only 14 million or 65 per cent came out to vote, of which Dr Ruto got 7 million votes and Mr Odinga got 6.9 million votes. Put another way, Dr Ruto got 32.5 per cent of the total voter population, Mr Odinga got 31.4 per cent, but those who did not vote were 7.9 million, or 35 per cent. There were more people who did not vote than those who voted for either of the two candidates. This speaks volumes as to the voters’ beliefs; they would rather stay home than vote for either.

Dr Ruto’s victory was secured from only two communities — Mt Kenya gave him almost 50 per cent of the vote (41 per cent from Mt Kenya and 8 per cent from Nairobi) and he secured a further 23 per cent votes from the Kalenjin. He was unable to secure more than 5 per cent from any other community, but that was enough to give him the needed 50 per cent +1 of the votes to get elected in the first round.

To win the election, Mr Odinga had to increase his vote tally from 45 per cent at the 2017 elections to 50 per cent plus 1, an increase of 5 per cent, he only managed to increase it to 48.8 per cent, a 3.8 per cent increase.

Dr Ruto, on the other hand, had to hang on as much as possible to his 54 per cent in 2017, and not lose more than 4 per cent. He lost 3.5 per cent, but he still managed to hang on to 50.5 per cent, sealing not only his victory, but a first-round win.

Mr Odinga’s failure to get his home turf to turn out in large numbers and his ceding ground in his traditional strongholds of Western, Ukambani and Coast, cost him the election.

It is my view based on this examination of the numbers that Dr Ruto did not win the election — Mr Odinga lost it.    BY DAILY NATION  

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